

**PROJECT NO. 50602**

**REVIEW OF 16 TAC § 25.503,  
OVERSIGHT OF WHOLESALE  
MARKET PARTICIPANTS**

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**PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION  
OF TEXAS**

**ORDER AMENDING §25.503  
AS APPROVED AT THE FEBRUARY 12, 2021 OPEN MEETING**

The Public Utility Commission of Texas (commission) adopts amendments to 16 Texas Administrative Code (TAC) §25.503, relating to oversight of wholesale market participants, with changes to the proposed text as published in the August 14, 2020 issue of the *Texas Register* (45 TexReg 5569). These amendments update the process used by the commission to select the entity to monitor wholesale market reliability-related requirements for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). These amendments also provide the commission discretion over whether to select such an entity. These amendments are adopted under Project Number 50602.

The commission received comments on the proposed amendments from the Office of Public Utility Counsel (OPUC), ERCOT, and Texas Industrial Energy Consumers (TIEC).

***General Comments***

OPUC filed comments supporting the commission's efforts to broaden the pool of candidates that are eligible to serve as the Reliability Monitor in the ERCOT wholesale market and recommending that the commission adopt the proposed amendments. OPUC argued that expanding the pool of candidates would introduce more competition to the selection process and ultimately lower costs for residential and small commercial customers in the ERCOT market.

TIEC filed comments explaining that the Reliability Monitor serves an important role in ensuring compliance with reliability standards under PURA, commission rules, and ERCOT requirements. TIEC also indicated that it could envision scenarios where it would be beneficial for entities other than the current Reliability Monitor, such as ERCOT, to act as the Reliability Monitor. TIEC stated that the commission should have the flexibility to select the appropriate entity as circumstances warrant. TIEC further emphasized the importance of the Reliability Monitor performing its role with “[i]ndependence, objectivity, and the absence of potential conflicts of interest,” as required by the commission’s proposed amendments.

### *Commission Response*

**The general comments filed by the commenters did not request any changes to the proposed amendments, pose any questions, or present any issues requiring the commission’s response.**

### *Changes to §25.503(j), Role of ERCOT in Enforcing Operating Standards*

The commission added language to §25.503(j) in response to comments made by TIEC related to §25.503(k). These changes are discussed in the commission’s response under §25.503(k).

### *Comments on 16 TAC §25.503(k), Responsibilities of the Reliability Monitor*

TIEC recommended that the commission include language that would limit the ability of ERCOT personnel with operational responsibilities to participate in the activities of the Reliability Monitor. In particular, with regard to the possibility that the commission select ERCOT as the Reliability Monitor, TIEC stated that “[i]f the Reliability Monitor is a department

within ERCOT, it is important to take precautions to ensure that [the] Reliability Monitor's personnel and activities will be appropriately segregated from the operational side.”

TIEC argued that ERCOT operational personnel, through either their operational decisions or the instructions, requests, or recommendations that they provide to market participants, may play a role in or alongside the occurrence of a violation. TIEC contended that these personnel and their supervisors might be relevant fact witnesses, but they should not be in a position to provide expert analysis, testimony, or subjective recommendations in a compliance proceeding. TIEC argued that in these situations, ERCOT's role in the enforcement action could be motivated by, or perceived to be motivated by, self-interest.

TIEC recommended the addition of specific language to §25.503(k): “The Reliability Monitor must not include any persons who currently have operational responsibilities within the ERCOT market. The Reliability Monitor may rely on ERCOT personnel with operational responsibilities to provide relevant facts, but shall not rely on such personnel for expert analysis, opinions, or testimony.”

### *Commission Response*

**The commission declines to adopt the language recommended by TIEC that would limit the ability of ERCOT personnel with operational responsibilities to participate in the activities of the Reliability Monitor. The commission agrees with TIEC that actions taken by ERCOT operational personnel can be material in wholesale investigations. However, the level of separation between the Reliability Monitor and ERCOT operational personnel**

need not be as absolute as TIEC recommends. Rather, the Reliability Monitor must operate with enough independence to provide an objective analysis of ERCOT's role in or around occurrences of non-compliance. If the commission directs ERCOT to assume all or part of the duties of the Reliability Monitor, the necessary degree of structural separation between the Reliability Monitor and ERCOT will depend upon the duties and responsibilities assumed.

By design, ERCOT plays an active role in the compliance process. §25.503(j) requires ERCOT to “monitor material occurrences of non-compliance with ERCOT procedures,” “promptly provide information to and respond to questions posed by the Reliability Monitor and the commission,” and “provide to the Reliability Monitor and the commission the support and cooperation the commission determines is necessary for the Reliability Monitor and the commission to perform their functions.” To accomplish this, ERCOT must, necessarily, provide expert analysis and opinions on whether a behavior was an occurrence of non-compliance, whether the occurrence was material, and whether it posed a reliability risk. TIEC's language prohibiting the Reliability Monitor from “rely[ing] on [ERCOT operational] personnel for expert analysis, opinions, or testimony” could stifle the exchange of information and expertise between ERCOT and the Reliability Monitor, and may reduce the Reliability Monitor's ability to thoroughly investigate compliance issues.

The commission does, however, agree with TIEC that the Reliability Monitor needs to have enough independence from ERCOT operational personnel to provide the commission with objective analysis on the role of ERCOT in potential occurrences of non-compliance. The

degree of separation between ERCOT operational personnel and the Reliability Monitor necessary to achieve adequate independence depends upon the entity that the commission selects to assume the role.

Although stylistic changes were proposed to §25.503(l)(1), both existing §25.503(l)(1) and proposed §25.503(l)(1) require the commission to consider the entity's independence, objectivity, and the absence of potential conflicts of interest as a part of the selection process. This requirement provides a significant safeguard against the ability of ERCOT operational personnel, or any other market entity, to unduly influence the recommendations that the Reliability Monitor provides to the commission.

To further address this issue, the commission adds the following language to §25.503(l): “If the commission selects an entity other than ERCOT to act as the Reliability Monitor, the Reliability Monitor must be independent from ERCOT and is not subject to the supervision of ERCOT with respect to its monitoring and investigative activities.”

Together, these provisions provide sufficient protection against undue influence in the future.

If the commission selects ERCOT to perform the duties of the Reliability Monitor, the risk of ERCOT operational personnel influencing the activities of the personnel assigned to perform those duties will increase. To address this scenario, the commission adds the following language to §25.503(j): “If directed by the commission, ERCOT must assume all or part of the duties and responsibilities of the Reliability Monitor under (k). ERCOT must assume these duties and responsibilities, including establishing appropriate

**safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure the independence and objectivity of ERCOT personnel with respect to the duties and responsibilities assumed, in the manner prescribed by the commission.”**

Because the commission has authority under PURA §39.151 to direct ERCOT to assume all or part of the duties and responsibilities of the Reliability Monitor, the types of safeguards required will vary depending upon the duties transferred. This language will allow the commission to appropriately tailor the safeguards it puts in place to the situation. These safeguards will be further supplemented by a number of other provisions that ERCOT is subject to, such as its obligation as a market entity under §25.503(f)(8) to “provide accurate and factual information and...not submit false or misleading information, or omit material information, in any communication with...the commission,” and to “exercise due diligence to ensure adherence to this provision throughout [ERCOT].” In the context of ERCOT personnel fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Reliability Monitor, the commission considers the actions that any ERCOT employee played in or around an occurrence of non-compliance reported to the commission to be material information, as well as the name and position of any person who contributed to any recommendation provided to the commission related to such an occurrence. The commission expects commission staff to consider the possible influence of ERCOT personnel in or around an occurrence of non-compliance when deciding whether to pursue an enforcement action and what magnitude of penalty to seek.

*Comments on 16 TAC §25.503(l) – Selection of the Reliability Monitor*

ERCOT recommended that the commission retain the existing requirement in §25.503(l) that the commission and ERCOT enter into a contract with the Reliability Monitor when the Reliability Monitor is an entity other than ERCOT. ERCOT argued that §25.503 outlines the general roles and responsibilities of ERCOT and the Reliability Monitor, but a requirement that the commission and ERCOT contract with the Reliability Monitor ensures the parties will more specifically detail their respective obligations and expectations. ERCOT explained that its contract with the current reliability monitor “contains myriad terms and obligations that are not identified in 25.503, and therefore helps provide additional guidance and accountability among the parties to that agreement.” ERCOT further explained that, while the absence of a contractual mandate would not prohibit the commission and ERCOT from contracting with a future reliability monitor, an express requirement would provide clarity on the issue.

**Commission Response:**

**The commission agrees with ERCOT that §25.503 does not detail all of the obligations, expectations, and relationships among the commission, ERCOT, and the Reliability Monitor. The commission adds a requirement that if the commission selects an entity other than ERCOT to act as the Reliability Monitor, the commission and ERCOT will enter into a contract with the selected entity.**

All comments, including any not specifically referenced herein, were fully considered by the commission. In adopting these amendments, the commission makes other minor modifications for the purpose of clarifying its intent.

These amendments are adopted under the Public Utility Regulatory Act, Tex. Util. Code §14.002 which provides the commission with the authority to make and enforce rules reasonably required in the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction; and §39.151, which grants the commission authority to adopt and enforce rules concerning reliability of the regional electrical network. Section 39.151 further provides that the commission may delegate to an independent organization responsibilities for establishing or enforcing such rules, which are subject to commission oversight and review.

Cross reference to statutes: Public Utility Regulatory Act §14.002 and §39.151.

**§25.503. Oversight of Wholesale Market Participants.**

- (a) **Purpose.** The purpose of this section is to establish the standards that the commission will apply in monitoring the activities of entities participating in the wholesale electricity markets, including markets administered by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), and enforcing the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) and ERCOT procedures relating to wholesale markets. The standards contained in this rule are necessary to:
- (1) protect customers from unfair, misleading, and deceptive practices in the wholesale markets, including ERCOT-administered markets;
  - (2) ensure that ancillary services necessary to facilitate the reliable transmission of electric energy are available at reasonable prices;
  - (3) afford customers safe, reliable, and reasonably priced electricity;
  - (4) ensure that all wholesale market participants observe all scheduling, operating, reliability, and settlement policies, rules, guidelines, and procedures established in the ERCOT procedures;
  - (5) clarify prohibited activities in the wholesale markets, including ERCOT-administered markets;
  - (6) monitor and mitigate market power as authorized by the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) §39.157(a) and prevent market power abuses;
  - (7) clarify the standards and criteria the commission will use when reviewing wholesale market activities;
  - (8) clarify the remedies for non-compliance with the Protocols relating to wholesale markets; and

- (9) prescribe ERCOT's role in enforcing ERCOT procedures relating to the reliability of the regional electric network and accounting for the production and delivery among generators and all other market participants and monitoring and obtaining compliance with operating standards within the ERCOT regional network.
- (b) **Application.** This section applies to all market entities, as defined in subsection (c) of this section.
- (c) **Definitions.** The following words and terms when used in this section have the following meaning, unless the context indicates otherwise:
- (1) **Artificial congestion** -- Congestion created when multiple foreseeable options exist for scheduling, dispatching, or operating a resource, and a market participant chooses an option that is not the most economical, that foreseeably creates or exacerbates transmission congestion, and that results in the market participant being paid to relieve the congestion it caused.
  - (2) **Efficient operation of the market** -- Operation of the markets administered by ERCOT, consistent with reliability standards, that is characterized by the fullest use of competitive auctions to procure ancillary services, minimal cost socialization, and the most economical utilization of resources, subject to necessary operational and other constraints.
  - (3) **ERCOT procedures** -- Documents that contain the scheduling, operating, planning, reliability, and settlement procedures, standards, and criteria that are public and in effect in the ERCOT power region, including the ERCOT Protocols,

ERCOT Operating Guides, and Other Binding Documents as amended from time to time but excluding ERCOT's internal administrative procedures. The Protocols generally govern when there are inconsistencies between the Protocols and the Operating Guides, except when ERCOT staff, consistent with subsection (i) of this section, determines that a provision contained in the Operating Guides is technically superior for the efficient and reliable operation of the electric network.

- (4) **Excess Revenue** -- Revenue in excess of the revenue that would have occurred absent a violation of PURA §39.157 or this section.
- (5) **Market entity** -- Any person or entity participating in the ERCOT-administered wholesale market, including, but not limited to, a load serving entity (including a municipally owned utility and an electric cooperative,) a power marketer, a transmission and distribution utility, a power generation company, a qualifying facility, an exempt wholesale generator, ERCOT, and any entity conducting planning, scheduling, or operating activities on behalf of, or controlling the activities of, such market entities.
- (6) **Market participant** -- A market entity other than ERCOT.
- (7) **Reliability Monitor** -- A person or entity selected by the commission to monitor compliance with all state reliability-related laws, rules, and ERCOT procedures including protocols, processes and any other operating standards applicable to the ERCOT Region.
- (8) **Resource** -- Facilities capable of providing electrical energy or load capable of reducing or increasing the need for electrical energy or providing short-term reserves into the ERCOT system. This includes generation and load resources.

- (d) **Standards and criteria for enforcement of ERCOT procedures and PURA.** The commission will monitor the activities of market entities to determine if such activities are consistent with ERCOT procedures; whether they constitute market power abuses or are unfair, misleading, or deceptive practices affecting customers; and whether they are consistent with the proper accounting for the production and delivery of electricity among generators and other market participants. When reviewing the activities of a market entity, the commission will consider whether the activity was conducted in a manner that:
- (1) adversely affected customers in a material way through the use of unfair, misleading, or deceptive practices;
  - (2) materially reduced the competitiveness of the market, including whether the activity unfairly impacted other market participants in a way that restricts competition;
  - (3) disregarded its effect on the reliability of the ERCOT electric system; or
  - (4) interfered with the efficient operation of the market.
- (e) **Guiding ethical standards.** Each market participant is expected to:
- (1) observe all applicable laws and rules;
  - (2) schedule, bid, and operate its resources in a manner consistent with ERCOT procedures to support the efficient and reliable operation of the ERCOT electric system; and

- (3) not engage in activities and transactions that create artificial congestion or artificial supply shortages, artificially inflate revenues or volumes, or manipulate the market or market prices in any way.
- (f) **Duties of market entities.**
- (1) Each market participant must be knowledgeable about ERCOT procedures.
  - (2) A market participant must comply with ERCOT procedures and any official interpretation of the Protocols issued by ERCOT or the commission.
    - (A) If a market participant disagrees with any provision of the Protocols or any official interpretation of the Protocols, it may seek an amendment of the Protocols as provided for in the Protocols, appeal an ERCOT official interpretation to the commission, or both.
    - (B) A market participant appealing an official interpretation of the Protocols or seeking an amendment to the Protocols must comply with the Protocols unless and until the interpretation is officially changed or the amendment is officially adopted.
    - (C) A market participant may be excused from compliance with ERCOT instructions or Protocol requirements only if such non-compliance is due to communication or equipment failure beyond the reasonable control of the market participant; if compliance would jeopardize public health and safety or the reliability of the ERCOT transmission grid, or create risk of bodily harm or damage to the equipment; if compliance would be inconsistent with facility licensing, environmental, or legal requirements; if required by applicable law; or for other good cause. A market

participant is excused under this subparagraph only for so long as the condition continues.

- (3) Whenever the Protocols require that a market participant make its “best effort” or a “good faith effort” to meet a requirement, or similar language, the market participant must act in accordance with the requirement unless:
  - (A) it is not technically possible to do so;
  - (B) doing so would jeopardize public health and safety or the reliability of the ERCOT transmission grid, or would create a risk of bodily harm or damage to the equipment;
  - (C) doing so would be inconsistent with facility licensing, environmental, or legal requirements; or
  - (D) other good cause exists for excusing the requirement.
- (4) When a market participant is not able to comply with a Protocol requirement or official interpretation of a requirement, or honor a formal commitment to ERCOT, the market participant has an obligation to notify ERCOT immediately upon learning of such constraints and to notify ERCOT when the problem ceases. A market participant who does not comply with a Protocol requirement or official interpretation of a requirement, or honor a formal commitment to ERCOT, has the burden to demonstrate, in any commission proceeding in which the failure to comply is raised, why it cannot comply with the Protocol requirement or official interpretation of the requirement, or honor the commitment.
- (5) The commission staff may request information from a market participant concerning a notification of failure to comply with a Protocol requirement or

official interpretation of a requirement, or honor a formal commitment to ERCOT. The market participant must provide a response that is detailed and reasonably complete, explaining the circumstances surrounding the alleged failure, and must provide documents and other materials relating to such alleged failure to comply. The response must be submitted to the commission staff within five business days of a written request for information, unless commission staff agrees to an extension.

- (6) A market participant's bids of energy and ancillary services must be from resources that are available and capable of performing, and must be feasible within the limits of the operating characteristics indicated in the resource plan, as defined in the Protocols, and consistent with the applicable ramp rate, as specified in the Protocols.
- (7) All statements, data and information provided by a market participant to market publications and publishers of surveys and market indices for the computation of an industry price index must be true, accurate, reasonably complete, and must be consistent with the market participant's activities, subject to generally accepted standards of confidentiality and industry standards. Market participants must exercise due diligence to prevent the release of materially inaccurate or misleading information.
- (8) A market entity has an obligation to provide accurate and factual information and must not submit false or misleading information, or omit material information, in any communication with ERCOT or with the commission. Market entities must exercise due diligence to ensure adherence to this provision throughout the entity.

- (9) A market participant must comply with all reporting requirements governing the availability and maintenance of a generating unit or transmission facility, including outage scheduling reporting requirements. A market participant must immediately notify ERCOT when capacity changes or resource limitations occur that materially affect the availability of a unit or facility, the anticipated operation of its resources, or the ability to comply with ERCOT dispatch instructions.
- (10) A market participant must comply with requests for information or data by ERCOT as specified by the Protocols or ERCOT instructions within the time specified by ERCOT instructions, or such other time agreed to by ERCOT and the market participant.
- (11) When a Protocol provision or its applicability is unclear, or when a situation arises that is not contemplated under the Protocols, a market entity seeking clarification of the Protocols must use the Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) process provided in the Protocols. If the NPRR process is impractical or inappropriate under the circumstances, the market entity may use the process for requesting formal Protocol clarifications or interpretations described in subsection (i) of this section. This provision is not intended to discourage day to day informal communication between market participants and ERCOT staff.
- (12) A market participant operating in the ERCOT markets or a member of the ERCOT staff who identifies a provision in the ERCOT procedures that produces an outcome inconsistent with the efficient and reliable operation of the ERCOT-administered markets must call the provision to the attention of ERCOT staff and the appropriate ERCOT subcommittee. All market participants must cooperate

with the ERCOT subcommittees, ERCOT staff, and the commission staff to develop Protocols that are clear and consistent.

- (13) A market participant must establish and document internal procedures that instruct its affected personnel on how to implement ERCOT procedures according to the standards delineated in this section. Each market participant must establish clear lines of accountability for its market practices.
- (g) **Prohibited activities.** Any act or practice of a market participant that materially and adversely affects the reliability of the regional electric network or the proper accounting for the production and delivery of electricity among market participants is considered a “prohibited activity.” The term “prohibited activity” in this subsection excludes acts or practices expressly allowed by the Protocols or by official interpretations of the Protocols and acts or practices conducted in compliance with express directions from ERCOT or commission rule or order or other legal authority. The term “prohibited activity” includes, but is not limited to, the following acts and practices that have been found to cause prices that are not reflective of competitive market forces or to adversely affect the reliability of the electric network:
- (1) A market participant must not schedule, operate, or dispatch its generating units in a way that creates artificial congestion.
  - (2) A market participant must not execute pre-arranged offsetting trades of the same product among the same parties, or through third party arrangements, which involve no economic risk and no material net change in beneficial ownership.

- (3) A market participant must not offer reliability products to the market that cannot or will not be provided if selected.
  - (4) A market participant must not conduct trades that result in a misrepresentation of the financial condition of the organization.
  - (5) A market participant must not engage in fraudulent behavior related to its participation in the wholesale market.
  - (6) A market participant must not collude with other market participants to manipulate the price or supply of power, allocate territories, customers or products, or otherwise unlawfully restrain competition. This provision should be interpreted in accordance with federal and state antitrust statutes and judicially-developed standards under such statutes regarding collusion.
  - (7) A market participant must not engage in market power abuse. Withholding of production, whether economic withholding or physical withholding, by a market participant who has market power, constitutes an abuse of market power.
- (h) **Defenses.** The term “prohibited activity” in subsection (g) of this section excludes acts or practices that would otherwise be included, if the market entity establishes that its conduct served a legitimate business purpose consistent with prices set by competitive market forces; and that it did not know, and could not reasonably anticipate, that its actions would inflate prices, adversely affect the reliability of the regional electric network, or adversely affect the proper accounting for the production and delivery of electricity; or, if applicable, that it exercised due diligence to prevent the excluded act or practice. The defenses established in this subsection may also be asserted in instances in

which a market participant is alleged to have violated subsection (f) of this section. A market entity claiming an exclusion or defense under this subsection, or any other type of affirmative defense, has the burden of proof to establish all of the elements of such exclusion or defense.

- (i) **Official interpretations and clarifications regarding the Protocols.** A market entity seeking an interpretation or clarification of the Protocols must use the NPRR process contained in the Protocols whenever possible. If an interpretation or clarification is needed to address an unforeseen situation and there is not sufficient time to submit the issue to the NPRR process, a market entity may seek an official Protocol interpretation or clarification from ERCOT in accordance with this subsection.
- (1) ERCOT must develop a process for formally addressing requests for clarification of the Protocols submitted by market participants or issuing official interpretations regarding the application of Protocol provisions and requirements. ERCOT must respond to the requestor within ten business days of ERCOT's receipt of the request for interpretation or clarification with either an official Protocol interpretation or a recommendation that the requestor take the request through the NPRR process.
- (2) ERCOT must designate one or more ERCOT officials who will be authorized to receive requests for clarification from, and issue responses to market participants, and to issue official interpretations on behalf of ERCOT regarding the application of Protocol provisions and requirements.

- (3) The designated ERCOT official must provide a copy of the clarification request to commission staff upon receipt. The ERCOT official must consult with ERCOT operational or legal staff as appropriate and with commission staff before issuing an official Protocol clarification or interpretation.
  - (4) The designated ERCOT official may decide, in consultation with the commission staff, that the language for which a clarification is requested is ambiguous or for other reason beyond ERCOT's ability to clarify, in which case the ERCOT official shall inform the requestor, who may take the request through the NPRR process provided for in the Protocols.
  - (5) All official Protocol clarifications or interpretations that ERCOT issues in response to a market participant's formal request or upon ERCOT's own initiative must be sent out in a market bulletin with the appropriate effective date specified to inform all market participants, and a copy of the clarification or interpretation must be maintained in a manner that is accessible to market participants. Such response must not contain information that would identify the requesting market participant.
  - (6) A market participant may freely communicate informally with ERCOT employees, however, the opinion of an individual ERCOT staff member not issued as an official interpretation of ERCOT pursuant to this subsection may not be relied upon as an affirmative defense by a market participant.
- (j) **Role of ERCOT in enforcing operating standards.** ERCOT must monitor material occurrences of non-compliance with ERCOT procedures, which means occurrences that

have the potential to impede ERCOT operations or represent a risk to system reliability. Non-compliance indicators monitored by ERCOT must include, but are not limited to, material occurrences of failing resource performance measures as established by ERCOT, failure to follow dispatch instructions within the required time, failure to meet ancillary services obligations, failure to submit mandatory bids or offers, and other instances of non-compliance of a similar magnitude.

- (1) ERCOT must keep a record of all such material occurrences of non-compliance with ERCOT procedures and must develop a system for tracking recurrence of such material occurrences of non-compliance.
- (2) ERCOT must promptly provide information to and respond to questions from market participants to allow the market participant to understand and respond to alleged material occurrences of non-compliance with ERCOT procedures. However, this requirement does not relieve the market participant's operator from responding to the ERCOT operator's instruction in a timely manner and shall not be interpreted as allowing the market participant's operator to argue with the ERCOT operator as to the need for compliance.
- (3) ERCOT must keep a record of the resolution of such material occurrences of non-compliance and of remedial actions taken by the market participant in each instance.
- (4) ERCOT must promptly provide information to and respond to questions posed by the Reliability Monitor and the commission.

- (5) ERCOT must provide to the Reliability Monitor and the commission the support and cooperation the commission determines is necessary for the Reliability Monitor and the commission to perform their functions.
  - (6) If directed by the commission, ERCOT must assume all or part of the duties and responsibilities of the Reliability Monitor under (k). ERCOT must assume these duties and responsibilities, including establishing appropriate safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure the independence and objectivity of ERCOT personnel with respect to the duties and responsibilities assumed, in the manner prescribed by the commission.
- (k) **Responsibilities of the Reliability Monitor.** The Reliability Monitor must gather and analyze information and data as needed for its reliability monitoring activities. The Reliability Monitor works under the direction and supervision of the commission. The Reliability Monitor must protect confidential information and data in accordance with the confidentiality standards established in PURA, the ERCOT protocols, commission rules, and other applicable laws. The requirements related to the level of protection to be afforded information protected by these laws and rules are incorporated into this section. The duties and responsibilities of the Reliability Monitor may include, but are not limited to:
- (1) Monitoring, investigating, auditing, and reporting to the commission regarding compliance with reliability-related ERCOT procedures, including Protocols, Operating Guides, and Other Binding Documents, the reliability-related

provisions of the commission's rules, and reliability-related provisions of PURA by market entities;

- (2) Providing reliability-related subject-matter advice, expertise, and assistance to the commission in the conduct of the commission's oversight and enforcement activities; and
- (3) Providing expert advice, analysis, reports, and testimony services relating to the Reliability Monitor's analysis and findings as part of the commission staff's case in enforcement proceedings.

- (1) **Selection of the Reliability Monitor.** The commission may select an entity to act as the Reliability Monitor. If the commission selects an entity other than ERCOT to act as the Reliability Monitor, the Reliability Monitor must be independent from ERCOT and is not subject to the supervision of ERCOT with respect to its monitoring and investigative activities. If the commission selects an entity other than ERCOT to act as the Reliability Monitor, the commission and ERCOT will enter into a contract with the selected entity. In selecting the Reliability Monitor, the commission must consider whether the Reliability Monitor satisfies the following criteria:

- (1) Independence, objectivity, and the absence of potential conflicts of interest;
- (2) Experience performing compliance monitoring of reliability-related laws;
- (3) Familiarity with the ERCOT Region and understanding of reliability-related ERCOT protocols, procedures, and other operating standards;
- (4) Ability to manage confidential information appropriately; and
- (5) Cost effectiveness.

(m) **Funding of the Reliability Monitor.** ERCOT must fund the operations of the Reliability Monitor from the fee authorized by PURA §39.151.

(n) **Standards for record keeping.**

- (1) A market participant who schedules through a qualified scheduling entity (QSE) that submits schedules to ERCOT on behalf of more than one market participants must maintain records to show scheduling, offer, and bidding information for all schedules, offers, and bids that its QSE has submitted to ERCOT on its behalf, by interval.
- (2) All market participants and ERCOT must maintain records relative to market participants' activities in the ERCOT-administered markets to show:
  - (A) information on transactions, as defined in §25.93(c)(3) of this title (relating to Quarterly Wholesale Electricity Transaction Reports), including the date, type of transaction, amount of transaction, and entities involved;
  - (B) information and documentation of all planned, maintenance, and forced generation and transmission outages including all documentation necessary to document the reason for the outage;
  - (C) information described under this subsection including transaction information, information on pricing, settlement information, and other information that would be relevant to an investigation under this section, and that has been disclosed to market publications and publishers of surveys and price indices, including the date, information disclosed, and

the name of the employees involved in providing the information as well as the publisher to whom it was provided; and

- (D) reports of the market participant's financial information given to external parties, including the date, financial results reported, and the party to whom financial information was reported, if applicable.
- (3) After the effective date of this section, all records referred to in this subsection except verbal dispatch instructions (VDIs) must be kept for a minimum of three years from the date of the event. ERCOT must keep VDI records for a minimum of two years. All records must be made available to the commission for inspection upon request.
- (4) A market participant must, upon request from the commission, provide the information referred to in this subsection to the commission, and may, if applicable, provide it under a confidentiality agreement or protective order pursuant to §22.71(d) of this title (relating to Filing of Pleadings, Documents, and Other Material).
- (o) **Investigation.** The commission staff may initiate an informal fact-finding review based on a complaint or upon its own initiative to obtain information regarding facts, conditions, practices, or matters that it may find necessary or proper to ascertain in order to evaluate whether any market entity has violated any provision of this section.
- (1) The commission staff will contact the market entity whose activities are in question to provide the market entity an opportunity to explain its activities. The

commission staff may require the market entity to provide information reasonably necessary for the purposes described in this subsection.

- (2) If the market entity asserts that the information requested by commission staff is confidential, the information must be provided to commission staff as confidential information related to settlement negotiations or other asserted bases for confidentiality pursuant to §22.71(d)(4) of this title.
- (3) If after conducting its fact-finding review, the commission staff determines that a market entity may have violated this section, the commission staff may request that the commission initiate a formal investigation against the market entity pursuant to §22.241 of this title (relating to Investigations).
- (4) If, as a result of its investigation, commission staff determines that there is evidence of a violation of this section by a market entity, the commission staff may request that the commission initiate appropriate enforcement action against the market entity. A notice of violation requesting administrative penalties or disgorgement of excess revenues must comply with the requirements of §22.246 of this title (relating to Administrative Penalties). Adjudication of a notice of violation requesting both an administrative penalty and disgorgement of excess revenues may be conducted within a single contested case proceeding. Additionally, for alleged violations that have been reviewed in the informal procedure established by this subsection, the commission staff must include as part of its prima facie case:
  - (A) a statement either that –

- (i) the commission staff has conducted the investigation allowed by this section; or
    - (ii) the market entity has failed to comply with the requirements of paragraph (5) of this subsection;
  - (B) a summary of the evidence indicating to the commission staff that the market entity has violated one of the provisions of this section;
  - (C) a summary of any evidence indicating to the commission staff that the market entity benefited from the alleged violation or materially harmed the market; and
  - (D) a statement that the staff has concluded that the market entity failed to demonstrate, in the course of the investigation, the applicability of an exclusion or affirmative defense under subsection (h) of this section.
- (5) A market entity subject to an informal fact-finding review or a formal investigation by the commission staff has an obligation to fully cooperate with the investigation, to make its company representatives available within a reasonable period of time to discuss the subject of the investigation with the commission staff, and to respond to the commission staff's requests for information within a reasonable time frame as requested by the commission staff.
- (6) The procedure for informal fact-finding review established in this subsection does not prevent any person or commission staff from filing a formal complaint with the commission pursuant to §22.242 of this title (relating to Complaints) or pursuing other relief available by law.

- (7) If, in the course of its investigation under this subsection, commission staff determines that formal enforcement action is not warranted, the commission staff may work with the market entity to ensure any issues of concern are addressed and appropriate remedial actions have been taken.
- (p) **Remedies.** If the commission finds that a market entity is in violation of this section, the commission may seek or impose any legal remedy it determines appropriate for the violation involved, provided that the remedy of disgorgement of excess revenues will be imposed for violations and continuing violations of PURA §39.157 and may be imposed for other violations of this section.

This agency certifies that the adoption has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be a valid exercise of the agency's legal authority. It is therefore ordered by the Public Utility Commission of Texas that §25.503 relating to oversight of wholesale market participants is hereby adopted with changes to the text as proposed.

**Signed at Austin, Texas the \_\_\_\_\_ day of February 2021.**

**PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS**

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**DEANN T. WALKER, CHAIRMAN**

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**ARTHUR C. D'ANDREA, COMMISSIONER**

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**SHELLY BOTKIN, COMMISSIONER**